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Reducing inequality is a tremendously important sustainable development goal.
Albeit providing stylised frames for modelling, also mathematics can contribute to
understanding and explaining the emergence of collective patterns in complex
socio-economic systems. It can then effectively help to identify actions and mea-
sures to be taken and support policy-makers towards adoption of conceivable wel-
fare measures aimed at halting the growth of inequality. Based on these
assumptions, we here discuss some variants of a mathematical “micro-to-macro”
model for the dynamics of taxation and redistribution processes in a closed trading
market society. The model has an exploratory character resulting from possible
tuning of various parameters involved: through its analysis, one can foresee the
consequences on the long-run income distributions of different fiscal policies and
differently weighted welfare policies, interventions, and subsidy provision, as well
as the impact of the extent of tax evasion. In short, the model shows that in the long
term redistributive policy results in a lower level of economic inequality in society.
Keywords: taxation and redistribution, welfare, income distribution, economic
inequality, mathematical models
1. Introduction
Income disparities and economic inequality are all but recent problems. They
are, however, becoming worryingly and increasingly significant (for a few refer-
ences in this regard see e.g. [1–7]). In fact, reducing inequality within and between
countries is one of the sustainable development goals included in the 2030 Agenda
of by the United Nations General Assembly. Certainly, such an objective is, as least
in the first instance, a main responsibility and competence of economists and
policy-makers. Nonetheless, mathematics can provide some hints and contributions
towards it.
The goal of this chapter is to provide a brief illustration of the role that mathe-
matics can play in this regard. By way of example, we will recall an elementary (first
approximation) model first proposed by Bertotti in [8], together with some variants
and extensions of it, developed and investigated in a series of other studies by
Bertotti et al. [9–13].
The approach of this model can be seen as a contribution attempt in the spirit of
complexity economics. This paradigm, which began to take shape in the late 1980s,
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looks at the economy as an evolving system, not in equilibrium, and puts emphasis
on the process through which structures and patterns emerge from the micro-
interactions (see e.g. [14–16]). Similarly, the perspective of the model here
discussed is to put the interactions among heterogeneous individuals at the very
heart of the question. These interactions lead to self-organised collective features
and macro-observables, which emerge from the system as a whole.
It should be noted here that during the last two/three decades a research line has
been developing, not only but mostly among the physicist’s community, which
addresses socio-economic questions and phenomena using ideas, methods and
tools, which have their roots in statistical mechanics and the kinetic theory of gases.
An explanation for that comes from the existing analogy, for example, between
complex systems composed by a number of individuals who interact exchanging
money with each other (may be participating in a financial market) and physical
systems consisting of a huge number of particles (atoms or molecules), which
interact with each other undergoing collisions.
A variety of tools and techniques, including for example Boltzmann type equa-
tions, Fokker-Planck type equations, Ising type models and agent-based simula-
tions, have been adapted and employed in this connection. See for example
references [17–21] and the survey papers [22, 23] that offer an interesting historical
perspective and also contain extensive bibliographies.
The model developed in the paper [8] and then further generalised and explored
in subsequent work [9–13] differs to a great extent from those we know belonging to
the mentioned literature strand. The motivation behind [8] was precisely to under-
stand how the taxation process and diverse fiscal systems could affect the income
distribution of a population. Aiming at modelling a fiscal system with taxes on
personal income levied at a finite number of progressive rates, with high-income
earners expected to pay more than low-income earners, as in the case of the Italian
IRPEF (Imposta sul Reddito delle Persone Fisiche), the most natural approach
seemed to be one dividing a population into a finite number of income classes. This is
the reason behind the construction of a discrete framework, suitable for the formu-
lation of the model, which will be briefly recalled in the next section. Albeit
expressed using a system of ordinary differential equations (ODE)—as many as the
income classes in the society—the model incorporates stochastic and probabilistic
components. In a nutshell, the ODE system governs the evolution in time of the
income distribution, generated by a whole of money exchanges expressing binary
individual interactions, and a whole of withdrawals and earnings of the individuals,
due to taxation and redistribution. Specifically, each differential equation in the
system describes the variation in time of the fraction of individuals belonging to a
certain class. As we will see in the next section, the framework allows possible tuning
of various parameters (the frequencies with which the interactions are supposed to
occur, the probability that in an encounter between two individuals the one who
pays is one or the other, the tax rates or other) that give it an exploratory character.
The study of the dynamics of the model, supported by some analytical results
and, inevitably, largely pursued through numerical simulations (performed using
Mathematica software [24]), focuses on the asymptotic behaviour of the system.
What all simulations suggest is that after a sufficiently long time the solutions of the
equations reach a stationary state corresponding to an income distribution, which
depends on the total wealth and the interaction parameters, but not on the specific
initial distribution. This stationary state represents in fact a macro-observable fea-
ture. At the micro-individual level, the economic exchanges continue to take place
and the situation is a non-equilibrium one.
The interest is to find and compare one with the other different shapes of the
asymptotic income distributions corresponding to different fiscal policies. In this
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connection, the model shows that over time redistributive policy leads to a
reduction of economic inequality.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows:
In Section 2, we recall the framework of the original model.
In Section 3, we revisit some insights and extensions of the model discussed in
previous work. The issues include the following:
• the occurrence of fat tails of the asymptotic income distribution in cases with a
high number of classes;
• the existence of a very good fit of certain asymptotic income distributions with
cases (characterised by suitable parameters) of the κ-generalised distribution
introduced by Kaniadakis [25] and then analysed in connection with real data
in the works [26, 27];
• the incorporation in the model of an additional welfare form;
• the analysis of the negative correlation between economic inequality and social
mobility predicted by the model;
• the effect of tax evasion.
In Section 4, a novel application of the model is developed, which shows the
impact of different fiscal policies.
Section 5 contains concluding considerations.
2. General framework
Referring the reader to the paper [8] for further explanations and details on the
mechanism behind the formulation of the proposed framework, we recall here that,
if n denotes the number of income classes of a population, characterised by their
average incomes r1 < r2 < … < rn, and xi tð Þ, with xi : R ! 0,þ∞½ Þ for i ¼ 1, 2, … , n
denotes the fraction at the time t of individuals belonging to the i-th class (with the
normalisation
Pn
i¼1xi ¼ 1), the variation in time of the quantities xi tð Þ may be
















xk, i ¼ 1, 2, … , n: (1)
The coefficients Cihk’s and the continuous functions T
i
hk½ ’s in (Eq. (1))
incorporate the instructions for the variation of the fraction of individuals (i.e. the
movement of individuals) from one class to another. They keep into account
“impoverishment and enrichment” due both to direct money exchanges taking
place between pairs of individuals and to the (small) withdrawals and earnings of
each individual, due to taxation and redistribution, processes that are here
considered as occurring in correspondence to each transaction. More precisely,
Cihk ∈ 0,þ∞½ Þ expresses the probability density that an individual of the h-th
class will belong to the i-th class after a direct interaction with an individual of the




hk ¼ 1 has to be satisfied for any fixed h
and k;
3
Taxation and Redistribution against Inequality: A Mathematical Model
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.100939
• Tihk½  : R
n ! R expresses the variation density in the i-th class due to an
interaction between an individual of the h-th class with an individual of the k-th




hk½  xð Þ ¼ 0 for any fixed h,
k and x∈Rn.
Specific expressions for these quantities have to be carefully calibrated if we
want, as is the case in the model at hand, to treat a case in which the total amount of
money is constant. Towards this, let
• S denote a fixed minimum amount of money that individuals may exchange;
• ph,k (for h, k ¼ 1, 2, … , n) denote the probability that in an interaction between
an individual of the h-th class with an individual of the k-th class, the one who
pays is the former one. In principle, no interaction may occur between
individuals of two classes, and thus, the ph,k are required to satisfy 0≤ ph,k ≤ 1
and ph,k þ pk,h ≤ 1;
• 0≤ τ1 ≤ τ2 ≤ … ≤ τn ≤ 1 denote the tax rates relative to the n income classes.
The ratio for the definition of Cihk and T
i
hk½  is that when an individual of the h-th
class pays a quantity S to an individual of the k-th class, this one in turn has to pay a
tax Sτk. The government, for its part, redistributes to the entire population the
revenue collected by all taxes and this one in particular (this redistribution may
be interpreted as public expenditure in health, education, security and defence,
transports and so on). From a practical standpoint, the effect of a payment of S
from an h-individual to a k-individual can be thought, bypassing the government, as
the same of a payment of S 1 τkð Þ from the h-individual to the k-individual and
payment of Sτk from the h-individual to the entire population.
Skipping here some technical details, we recall that the expressions proposed in
paper [8] for Cihk and T
i
hk½  are as follows: each C
i







where the only nonzero elements aihk are a
i
ij ¼ 1 for i, j ¼ 1, 2, … , n and the only

















whereas Tihk½  xð Þ ¼ U
i
hk½  xð Þ þ V
i
hk½  xð Þ, with


























In particular, Uihk½  xð Þ keeps track of the advancement from a class to the subse-
quent one, due to the benefit of tax revenue redistribution and V ihk½  xð Þ of the
retrocession from a class to the preceding one, due to the payment of some tax. The
symbol δh,k denotes the Kronecker delta and all expressions are to be thought as
present only for meaningful values of the indices.
Well-posedness of the equation system (Eq. (1)) is proved in [8]: in correspon-
dence to any initial condition x0 ¼ x01, … , x0nð Þ with x0i ≥0 for all i ¼ 1, 2, … , n
and
Pn
i¼1x0i ¼ 1, a unique solution x tð Þ ¼ x1 tð Þ, … , xn tð Þð Þ of (Eq. (1)), satisfying
x 0ð Þ ¼ x0, exists, defined for all t∈ 0,þ∞½ Þ, and such that for all t≥0, both xi tð Þ≥0
for i ¼ 1, 2, … , n and
Pn
i¼1xi tð Þ ¼ 1 hold true. Hence, the solutions of (Eq. (1)) are
distribution functions. Also, the expressions of Uihk½  xð Þ and V
i
hk½  xð Þ above simplify
becoming linear in the variables x j and the right-hand sides of (Eq. (1)) turn out to
be polynomials of degree three.
A second result proved in [8] is that the scalar function μ xð Þ ¼
Pn
i¼1rixi,
expressing the global income (total amount of money) and, due to the population
normalisation, also the mean income, is a first integral for the system (Eq. (1)).
Also, the following empirical fact (not analytically proved) is recognised to be
true according to a large number of numerical simulations. If the parameters in the
model are fixed, for any fixed value of the global income μ, a unique asymptotic
stationary solution of (Eq. (1)) exists to which all solutions x tð Þ ¼ x1 tð Þ, … , xn tð Þð Þ
satisfying x 0ð Þ ¼ x0 with μ x0ð Þ ¼ μ (i.e. all solutions evolving from initial condi-
tions which share the same value μ of the global income) tend as t ! ∞.
As already emphasised, a great freedom remains for the choice of various
parameters, namely the average incomes r1, r2, … , rn, the tax rates τ1, τ2, … , τn, and
the ph,k for h, k ¼ 1, 2, … , n. Different cases were already considered in [8].
3. Properties of the model and its variants
The first result of interest from a socio-economic point of view, which is
discussed in [8] is that for fixed parameters r1, r2, … , rn and ph,k (h, k ¼ 1, 2, … , n)
and fixed growth laws of the tax rates 0≤ τ1 ≤ τ2 ≤ … ≤ τn ≤ 1, the effect of an
increase of the difference τn  τ1 between the maximum and the minimum tax rate
in correspondence to the stationary income distribution is an increase of the frac-
tion of individuals belonging to the middle classes, accompanied by a decrease of
the fraction of individuals belonging to the poorest and the richest classes. We
remark that only five income classes were considered in [8], the motivation being
that the number of different tax rates generally foreseen in real world is similarly
small (in Italy the number of the IRPEF tax rates relative to different income ranges
is exactly five).
To try and see whether the model allows to obtain long-time stationary income
distributions with shapes exhibiting fat tails as it occurs in real world, a larger
number of classes in the model were considered in the work by Bertotti et al. [9].
Various choices of the parameters were evaluated. The purpose was to deal with
cases as realistic as possible, and initial distributions of the population were chosen
with a majority of individuals in lower-income classes and only a minority in higher
income classes. In this way, stationary income distributions with Pareto-like behav-
iour were found.
Among other aspects to be explored, the curiosity remained to see whether one
can find an analytic expression of a distribution, to which the stationary solutions of
the model suit. A focus of the paper [10] by Bertotti et al. is on the search for such
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an analytic expression. Several parameter choices as well as various distributions
proposed in the literature are considered in that paper. What is found is that an
excellent fitting can be obtained between distributions arising from numerical
simulations of the model and the κ-generalised distribution proposed by Kaniadakis
in [25]. And it is worth pointing out that, in turn, the κ-generalised distribution has
proved to greatly perform when considered in connection with empirical data: for
example, its agreement with data on personal income of Germany, Italy and the
United Kingdom is discussed by Kaniadakis et al. in [26] and that one with data on
personal income of Australia and the United States by Kaniadakis et al. in [27].
In real life, welfare policies provide benefits, in particular to the lowest income
classes, in connection with health care, education, home, to help improve living
conditions. To simulate a policy of this kind, a modified version of the model is
treated in the paper by Bertotti et al. [11], where also the contribution of what can be
considered as a welfare form is incorporated. This is achieved through some weights
that differently measure the amount of tax revenue redistributed among classes. In
the same paper, also a comparison is established between different ways to fight
economic inequality. A specific result therein obtained is that, at least under certain
hypotheses, inequality reduction is more efficiently reached by a policy of reduction
of the welfare and subsidies for the rich classes than by an enlargement of the tax
rate difference τn  τ1 aimed at taxing rich people much more than poor ones.
A further issue on which the model was tested relates to social mobility. Empir-
ical data relative to several countries show the general existence of a negative
correlation between economic inequality and mobility (a reference for that being
e.g. the article by Corak [1]). This relevant topic is dealt with in the paper by
Bertotti et al. [12]. Certainly, in the model at hand, one cannot distinguish different
generations. Nonetheless, some indicators are introduced, useful to quantify mobil-
ity, which is meant here as a probability for individuals of a given class to climb up
[respectively, down] the income ladder and pass to an upper [respectively, lower]
class. Without entering technical details, we emphasise that a negative correlation
between economic inequality and upward mobility turns out to be in fact a feature
of the model.
Finally, the question of tax evasion, occurring as a matter of fact in a stronger or
weaker form in several countries, can be and was investigated in the context of the
model under consideration. In the work by Bertotti et al. [13], for instance, also the
co-existence of different evasion levels among individuals was postulated and its
consequences were explored. In particular, it was shown there that, besides leading
to a reduction in tax revenue, the evasion misbehaviour too contributes to an
increase of economic inequality.
4. The impact of different fiscal policies towards economic inequality
To give a further illustration of the impact of different fiscal policies on the
shape of income distribution and economic inequality as suggested by the model,
we develop in this section a novel application.
To solve numerically the differential equations, we have to fix the parameters
that are so far free. We choose for example
• the number of income classes in which the population is divided to be equal to
n ¼ 15,
• the unitary amount of money that can be exchanged in each transaction to be
given by S ¼ 1,
6
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• the average incomes of the classes to be linearly growing according to
r j ¼ 25 j, (5)
• the tax rates relative to the different income classes to be of the form
τ j ¼ τmin þ
j 1
n 1
τmax  τminð Þ, (6)
for j ¼ 1, … , n, with τmin rand τmax respectively denoting the minimum and
maximum tax rate.
Finally,
• with the purpose to define reasonable heterogeneous transaction and payment
probabilities, we assume the coefficients ph,k to be given by
ph,k ¼ min rh, rkf g=4rn, (7)
except for the terms
p j,j ¼ r j=2rn for j ¼ 2, … , n 1,
ph,1 ¼ r1=2rn for h ¼ 2, … , n,
pn,k ¼ rk=2rn for k ¼ 1, … , n 1,
p1,k ¼ 0 for k ¼ 1, … , n,
ph,n ¼ 0 for h ¼ 1, … , n:
(8)
Such a choice stands for the belief that poorer individuals usually spend and earn
less than richer ones. The requirements for the coefficients with h, k ¼ 1 or n are of
a technical nature, due to constraints on the extreme classes.
According to the empirical result recalled at the end of Section 2, for a specific
given model (i.e. once parameters are fixed), the solutions of (Eq. (1)) evolving
from all initial conditions x0 with the same global income tend to a same asymptotic
equilibrium.
The application we are going to discuss here includes four steps and is
constructed as follows:
• Step (i): Starting from a quasi-random initial condition x0 (the only
requirement for realism being that the majority of individuals occupy the
lowest income classes), we assume that in the closed society at hand no
taxation exists. Accordingly, we put τmin ¼ 0 and τmax ¼ 0. Making to evolve
the equations (Eq. (1)) for a sufficiently long time, we obtain an “asymptotic”
stationary solution corresponding to a first income distribution, which is
displayed in Panel (i) in Figure 1.
• Step (ii): We postulate at this point the introduction of a taxation system that
provides the same tax rate for each income class. Towards this and to fix ideas,
we choose τmin ¼ τmax ¼ 20%. Then, we take the asymptotic stationary solution
of step (i) as the initial condition, and we make the equations (Eq. (1)) (which
are of course different from those in the previous step) evolve. After a
sufficiently long time, a new “asymptotic” stationary solution is reached,
which represents a second income distribution. It is that one displayed in Panel
(ii) in Figure 1.
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• Step (iii): To simulate the implementation of a more targeted fiscal policy, we
now introduce another change amounting to the choice of a progressive
taxation. Equivalently, we fix different tax rates, lower for low-income earners
and higher for high-income earners. Specifically, we choose here τmin ¼ 20%
and τmax ¼ 50%. The “asymptotic” stationary solution obtained in
Figure 1.
The four panels display the stationary income distributions in correspondence to the same given global income
for the four different fiscal policies described in steps (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv). Even a simple look provides
evidence of the fact that in passing from each panel to the next one the fraction of individuals in the poorest as




correspondence to an initial condition coinciding with the asymptotic
stationary solution of step (ii) is displayed in Panel (iii) in Figure 1.
• Step (iv): As a further focused fiscal policy, we also incorporate in the taxation
algorithm what can be thought of as an addition of welfare provision. From a
technical point of view, this can be achieved through the introduction of
suitable weights in the terms Uihk½  xð Þ and V
i
hk½  xð Þ in system (Eq. (1)). Such
weights allow to differently measure the portion of redistributed tax revenue
to individuals of different income classes. A formula able to realise this is given
in [11], and we refer to that paper for further details. What is of interest here is
the final “asymptotic” income distribution relative to the equations, which
include this modification and to an initial condition coinciding with the
asymptotic stationary solution of step (iii). This income distribution is shown
in Panel (iv) in Figure 1.
Already a simple look at the panels in Figure 1 provides evidence of the fact that
the effect in the long run of each of the different fiscal policies adopted throughout
the steps (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) is to modify the income distribution over the
population so as to lower the number of individuals in the poorest as well as in the
richest classes, simultaneously increasing this number in the intermediate classes.
Also, an alternative, unified representation of the four stationary income distribu-
tions corresponding to the four different taxation system fiscal policies (i), (ii),
(iii), and (iv) is given in Figure 2. Lastly, in Figure 3 the evolution in time of the
fraction of individuals in the 15 income classes is displayed. Once again, together
with others, one may notice that the fractions of individuals that are initially the
largest and the smallest (fractions to which the poorest and the richest individuals
belong) are both non-increasing in time.
We emphasise that economic inequality decreases in passing from the income
distribution displayed in Panel (i) of Figure 1 to the income distributions in Panel
(ii). The same holds true in passing from the distribution in Panel (ii) to that one in
Panel (iii), and from the distribution in Panel (ii) to that one in Panel (iv).
Figure 2.
An alternative representation of the stationary income distributions in correspondence to a given global income
for the four different taxation systems fiscal policies described in steps (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv). One clearly
notices that the fraction of the poorest and the fraction of the richest individuals decrease when passing from the
distribution for step (i) (corresponding to the strip [0,1]) to the distribution for step (iv) (corresponding to the
strip [3, 4]).
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A quantitative measure of economic inequality is given by the Gini coefficient G
(named after the Italian statistician and economist C. Gini who introduced it in
the early twentieth century, see [28]), whose definition we recall next: if the Lorenz
curve expresses on the y-axis, the cumulative percentage of the total income of a
population earned by the bottom percentage of individuals (represented, in turn,
on the x-axis), denote A1 the area between the Lorenz curve of the distribution at
hand and the line of perfect equality y ¼ x, characterising a uniform distribution;
also, denote A2 the total area under the line of perfect equality. The Gini coefficient is
defined as the ratio A1=A2 and takes values in the interval 0, 1½ . The extreme values 0
and 1 of G respectively represent complete equality and complete inequality.
The Gini coefficients relative to the income distributions in the Panels (i), (ii),
(iii), and (iv) in Figure 1 are
G ¼ 0:453551, G ¼ 0:426308, G ¼ 0:386833, G ¼ 0:365182 (9)
respectively.
Figure 3.
The evolution in time of the fraction of individuals in the 15 income classes for the model with fiscal policies as
in steps (ii), (iii), and (iv). One may notice, in particular, that the fractions of individuals which are initially
(in the stationary distribution reached in absence of taxes) the largest and the smallest—fractions to which the
poorest and the richest individuals belong—are both non-increasing in time.
Figure 4.
The graph of the Gini coefficient as a function of time in correspondence to the application in the sequence of the
three different fiscal policies adopted throughout the steps (ii), (iii), and (iv).
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It is also worth noting that the Gini coefficient decreases along with the solutions
of the equation systems relative to the three models defined in steps (ii), (iii), and
(iv). In particular, in Table 1 some values of G are reported, relative to the income
distributions in a finite number of instants during the evolution of the three
dynamical systems. An overall picture of this behaviour is contained in Figure 4:
there, the graph of the Gini coefficient as a function of time is shown, in corre-
spondence to the application in the sequence of the three different fiscal policies
adopted throughout the steps (ii), (iii), and (iv). Lastly, Figure 5 displays the
Lorenz curves corresponding to the stationary income distributions reached at the
end of steps (i), (ii), (ii), and (iv).
Time t G for (ii)a G for (iii)b G for (iv)c
500 0.4474 0.4170 0.3812
1000 0.4430 0.4102 0.3771
2500 0.4349 0.3978 0.3703
5000 0.4292 0.3899 0.3665
10,000 0.4266 0.3871 0.3653
25,000 0.4263 0.3868 0.3652
55,000 0.4263 0.3868 0.3652
arefers the solution at time $t$ of the equation system with coefficients as in step (ii),
brefers to the solution at time $t$ of the equation system with coefficients as in step (iii),
crefers to the solution at time $t$ of the equation system with coefficients as in step (iv).
Table 1.
In this table, the Gini coefficients G relative to the income distributions are evaluated in correspondence of a
finite number of times for the model systems described in steps (ii), (iii), and (iv). One sees here that each of
the solutions G decreases. Accordingly, economic inequality is decreasing for each of the three models (ii), (iii),
and (iv), models characterised respectively by the existence of a taxation system with a unique tax rate, the
existence of a progressive taxation system with different tax rates, the existence of a taxation system integrated
by welfare.
Figure 5.
The Lorenz curves corresponding to the stationary income distributions reached at the end of steps (i), (ii), (ii),
and (iv). The variable on the x-axis denotes the bottom percentage of individuals and the variable on the y-axis
is the cumulative percentage of the total income earned by the corresponding percentage of individuals. The
Lorenz curves referring to the final distribution relative to steps (i), (ii), (ii), and (iv) are ordered from the
lowest to the highest. Accordingly, in passing from step (i) to step (ii) to step (iii) to step (iv) the Gini coefficient
decreases.
11
Taxation and Redistribution against Inequality: A Mathematical Model
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.100939
5. Conclusions
In this chapter, we have revisited, also discussing a novel application of it, a
mathematical “micro-to-macro” model suitable for the study of the aggregate for-
mation of the income distribution in a closed market society out of a whole of
economic interactions including taxation and redistribution. The model, originally
proposed by Bertotti in [8], was further developed and analysed in various papers
by Bertotti et al. [9–13]. We have shown that it can be adapted to analyse issues
related to economic inequality. In particular, the model identifies in redistributive
policy a driver towards economic inequality reduction. The theme is complex and
requires a broad spectrum of skills, knowledge, real data, ideas. The model encom-
passes (as is inevitable) great simplifications and probably a naive approach, and
cannot offer magical solutions to the problems it addresses. Nonetheless, thanks to
the considerable flexibility it enjoys and to its ability to make predictions in the
presence of different conditions and policies, it could hopefully contribute to pro-
viding some insight towards forecasting of possible outcomes and behaviours, in
this way serving as an inspiration and source of suggestions for policy-makers.
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